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Abstract 
 
This article is concerned with the legal and regulatory control of electoral campaigning online, 
in particular ‘microtargeting’.  There has been a longstanding consensus in the UK on how to 
control political advertising, yet the shift of expenditure to the online environment, together with 
innovations in digital campaigning tools, are exposing tensions and gaps in the current regime.  
One central harm associated with microtargeting is its potential to undermine meaningful 
democratic deliberation.  The article interrogates the issues through the lens of electoral law 
and regulation, and questions the extent to which a recalibration is necessary to deal with the 
challenges of digital campaigning.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Political advertising in the UK is undergoing radical change, challenging a longstanding 
regulatory framework.  Restrictions on political advertising have a long provenance, dating back 
to the nineteenth century, but in more recent times emphasis has shifted to the control of mass 
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media campaigning tools.  In terms of the normative basis of regulation, the system seeks, on the 
one hand, to protect freedom of expression, while on the other, it ensures the democratic system 
is not distorted by powerful interest groups.  The ban on political advertising on broadcast media 
was for many years core to the regulatory framework, as a means of ensuring that there was no 
electoral ‘arms race’ in advertising expenditure.1  Restrictions on party spending has been 
another flank of regulation; the growth of national media campaigns tended to eschew strict 
limits on constituency-level campaign expenditure.  This was remedied by the introduction of 
legislation in 2000 imposing national campaign spending caps supervised and enforced by a new 
regulator, the Electoral Commission (ELC).   
 
While for a period relatively stable, in recent years it has been suggested electoral law is in need 
of substantial reform to deal principally with the shift to digital advertising, particularly the use 
of data to target individual voters with tailored political messages (so-called ‘microtargeting’).2  
The case for reform is gaining traction, with the ELC publishing a raft of proposals, albeit 
modest in nature.3  The controversies surrounding microtargeting are part of the broader debate 
on online disinformation (aka ‘fake news’), and it is often analysed in that context.  In that 
regard, there have been a plethora of other reports and investigations which have touched on the 
issue of microtargeting, notably the House of Commons Digital, Culture Media and Sport 
                                                          
1 Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life The Funding of Political Parties in the United 
Kingdom Cm 4057–I, October 1998 (hereafter the ‘Neill Committee’) para 13.11. 
2 Council of Europe Study on the use of internet in electoral campaigns, Council of Europe study 
(DGI(2017) April 2018) p 23 (hereafter ‘CoE report’). 
3 Electoral Commission Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters (June 2018). 
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Committee’s (DCMSC) inquiry4 and the EU Commission’s initiatives,5 including the adoption of 
a code of practice.6   
 
Microtargeting also raises serious issues concerning individuals’ privacy and data protection 
rights.7  Even the most casual observer cannot have escaped the press coverage, parliamentary 
scrutiny and regulatory action taken with respect to the alleged misuse of data in recent elections 
and referendums.8  While of the upmost importance, for the purposes of this article, the question 
of the legality of the procuring and use of personal data will not be discussed directly.9   
                                                          
4 House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Interim 
Report, Fifth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 363, 29 July 2018 (hereafter ‘DCMSC interim report’); 
House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final 
Report, Eighth Report of Session 2017–19, HC 1791, 14 February 2019 (hereafter ‘DCMSC final report’);  
5 Commission Communication Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, COM(2018)236 
final) pp 7-8; EU Commission Action Plan against Disinformation (JOIN(2018) 36 final); European 
Commission A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation: Report of the independent High Level 
Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (March 2018) pp 12, 22.   
6 EU Commission, EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (26 September 2018) (hereafter ‘EU CoP’) 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation 
7 For a discussion see: Information Commissioner’s Office Democracy disrupted? Personal information 
and political influence (11 July 2018); European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on online 
manipulation and personal data (Opinion 3/2018) (hereafter ‘EDPS report’). 
8 For an overview see Emily Haves Personal Data, Social Media and Election Campaigns (Lords Library 
notes LLN-2018-0061, 13 June 2018).   
9 The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) is currently investigating several organisations concerning 
the use of data analytics for political purposes and potential breaches of data protection law, including 
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Rather, the central focus of this article is on whether such techniques have the potential to distort 
the public discourse and subvert the democratic process, and if so, how should the law respond.  
The analysis here is on the regulation of political parties and campaign groups who seek to 
influence electoral outcomes directly, rather than broader forms of political expression online.  
Such a distortion may result from the unmediated nature of the messages.  First, targeted 
advertisements can escape the attention of the media and the public such that political campaigns 
may make contradictory claims to different segments of the electorate.  Second, messages may 
be designed to play to some voters’ prejudices and biases without any exposure to countervailing 
viewpoints.  This may lead to a greater polarisation and fragmentation of society, and ultimately 
undermine the ability of voters to engage in meaningful democratic deliberation.10  The evidence 
which exists is considered in more detail in the next section.  One of the key questions is whether 
intervention can be justified on the basis of risk rather than proof of actual harm.  A further 
problem relates to the need to avoid regulation which limits political discourse online.  There are 
also inherent dangers in seeking to restrict or control the content of political speech.11  Measures 
which seek to maximise transparency for voters, while exposing political messages to public 
                                                          
alleged criminal offences.  In this connection, Facebook has been fined £500,000 (the maximum civil 
penalty) for breaches of Data Protection Act 1998.  For further information see: https://ico.org.uk/about-
the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/10/facebook-issued-with-maximum-500-000-fine/ 
10 For a discussion see J Habermas ‘Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still 
Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research’ (2006) 16 
Communication Theory 411.   
11 Of course, this may be necessary in certain circumstances (eg, hate speech).   
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scrutiny, should always be preferred over more restrictive controls.  The policy dilemma arises 
when such measures prove to be ineffective.   
 
In terms of the dimensions of the problem and possible solutions, there a number of options.  
First, there are measures to increase the transparency of digital messages enabling voters to judge 
the credibility of targeted messages on the basis of their provenance and whether they have been 
paid for.  The use of online repositories may also lead to greater scrutiny of the messages 
targeted.  Second, reforms could be made to the reporting requirements political campaigners are 
required to follow, and tighter restrictions on advertising from outside the UK.  There remains a 
third approach, which is to place substantive restrictions on online advertising.  In designing any 
interventions, great care would be needed to minimise any limits on political expression.  The 
case for substantive restrictions should not be ruled out, however, especially if other less 
interventionist measures prove to be unworkable or are subverted.  The problems also raise 
classic concerns of regulatory theory, in particular: regulatory fragmentation, since responsibility 
for regulation is likely to be dispersed across different actors (government, agencies, and 
crucially the industry);12 information asymmetries, given the techniques used are characterised 
                                                          
12 J Black ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation’ 
[2003] PL 63.  For a detailed explanation of the digital advertising industry see: S Adshead, G Forsyth, S 
Wood, L Wilkinson Online advertising in the UK (Plum/DCMS, January 2019) available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/77799
6/Plum_DCMS_Online_Advertising_in_the_UK.pdf 
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by high levels of innovation; and the costs of regulatory failure, which are particularly high here 
given the potential harm to the democratic process.   
 
 
2. A PRIMER ON MICROTARGETING 
 
This section explains the ‘mechanics’ of microtargeting, identifies the key actors, how it is used, 
and its possible effects, both negative and positive.13  As a cautionary note, the negative effects 
of microtargeting should neither be assumed nor exaggerated.  The literature overall tends to 
frame new innovations in political campaigning in pessimistic terms.  The intention here is to 
expose the risks to enable a discussion of if and how to design appropriate legal responses.   
 
Targeting of voters is by no means a new phenomenon.  Political parties have for many years 
collected data on voters, dividing them into segments based on their characteristics (in particular, 
geographic, demographic and previous voting behaviour), with a view to designing specific 
political content for each segment.14  The difference with microtargeting is the potential: to bring 
                                                          
13 In line with the scope of this article, the obvious threats to privacy and data protection rights are not 
discussed here.   
14 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance Digital Microtargeting: Political Party 
Innovation Primer (Stockholm: IDEA, 2018) p 10 (hereafter IDEA).  On the changing models of 
campaigning, from mass-centred to individual-centred campaigns, see S Kruschinski and A Haller 
‘Restrictions on data-driven political micro-targeting in Germany’ (2017) 6(4) Internet Policy Review 
available at https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/restrictions-data-driven-political-micro-targeting-
germany 
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together data from various sources (or ‘datapoints’), to draw inferences about political beliefs 
and biases from seemingly unrelated data (such as internet browsing and purchases), to target 
messages to voters at a high level of granularity, to test the efficacy of campaign messages in real 
time, and to differentiate messages to particular voters.  We also know, as elections become 
‘datafied’, political campaigners are increasingly reliant on digital intermediaries, whose 
influence over the democratic process may be problematic.15   
 
(a) The key techniques of microtargeting 
 
What follows is a brief sketch of the key methods of microtargeting, the different types of 
intermediaries involved, and their respective roles.16   
 
(i) DATA COLLECTION AND AGGREGATION 
 
Political parties have traditionally maintained information on individual voters, gathering 
information from public sources (principally the electoral register), together with their own 
canvassing data.  Other data is gathered from various other commercial sources, including on: 
geographic location, basic demographic data (age, gender, income, education etc); search and 
online activity (which can be used to identify a voter’s specific political interests or leanings, or 
                                                          
15 J Bartlett, J Smith and R Acton The future of political campaigning (DEMOS, July 2018) p 26. 
16 For an overview see: IDEA, above n 14, pp 10-16; D Tambini ‘Social Media Power and Election 
Legitimacy’ in M Moore and D Damian Tambini (eds) Digital Dominance: The Power of Google, Amazon, 
Facebook, and Apple (Oxford: OUP, 2018) pp 274-278; EDPS report, above n 7, pp 7-9. 
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seemingly less relevant information, such as online purchasing behaviour).17  As has been the 
case for a number of years, growing out of commercial online advertising, there are a number of 
‘data brokers’ supplying data for political advertising.18  The platforms themselves also collect 
and aggregate data on their users, facilitating targeting.  Data exchanges, which provide for the 
automated buying and placing of digital advertisements through real-time ‘auctions’ (so-called 
‘programmatic advertising’), also exploit large amounts of data held on individuals.19   
 
(ii) VOTER SEGMENTATION AND PROFILING 
 
Voter segmentation means ‘dividing the electorate into smaller blocks, and using different 
campaign methods for each segment’.20  While not a new practice, it is becoming increasingly 
efficient due, first, to the high level of granularity of the data which is now collected and, second, 
the sophisticated methods of profiling which can be employed.   
 
There are two principal means of profiling.  Personal data can be used to predict political views 
and party allegiances, the probability of voting, and which issues are likely to have particular 
resonance with individuals (‘predictive’ profiling).  More controversially, what is referred to as 
                                                          
17 For a detailed account of the online advertising industry, see Adhead et al., above n 12. 
18 See ICO, above n 9, p 58. 
19 Bartlett et al., above n 15, p 7; J Chester and KC Montgomery ‘The role of digital marketing in political 
campaigns’ (2017) 6(4) Internet Policy Review available at https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/role-
digital-marketing-political-campaigns 
20 IDEA, above n 14, p 12. 
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‘psychographic’ profiling is increasingly employed, a technique whereby data analytics firms 
profile voters according to personality traits.21  In terms of data collection, one method is to 
incentivise people to undertake personality tests, and then cross-reference results with other 
online or personal data.22  Psychographic data can also be inferred from online behaviour more 
generally.  Although the veracity and effectiveness of such techniques is currently a matter of 
debate,23 its use in political campaigning is well documented, especially its potential to achieve 
greater precision of salient and persuasive messages.24   
 
While many of the techniques involved in microtargeting are controversial, ‘lookalike 
modelling’ has attracted particular opprobrium.  This technique enables campaigners to reach 
new audiences on platforms (referred to as ‘peer groups’ or ‘persuadables’) due to their sharing 
similar characteristics or profiles to existing audiences (‘cloning’);25 Facebook offers a 
‘lookalike’ service which has been used by political campaigns.26   
 
(iii) CREATING AND TESTING PERSONALISED MESSAGES 
 
                                                          
21 EDPS report, above n 7, p 8. 
22 Bartlett et al., above n 15, p 21. 
23 EDPS report, above n 7, p 9. 
24 Bartlett et al., above n 15, pp 1-22, 31 (and the references cited therein).   
25 Chester and Montgomery, above n 19.   
26 Bartlett et al., above n 15, p 28; EDPS report, above n 7, p 8.   
 10 
 
As was noted above, a key advantage of microtargeting is the increased precision and efficiency 
of targeting.  One of the reasons for this is the testing of messages on an iterative basis through 
the use of algorithms (so-called ‘A/B testing’).  While campaign messages have long been 
subject to testing to maximise their resonance with voters (especially through focus groups), the 
use of social media and commercial advertising methodologies has resulted in a ‘step change in 
pace and scale’.27  One of the disturbing effects of such technology is said to be the dislocation 
of the politicians from any effective engagement with, or understanding of, the electorate.28   
 
(b) The potential benefits and harms of microtargeting29 
 
Microtargeting may lead to a levelling of the political playing field and a greater diversity of 
viewpoints.  Political parties benefit from more precise targeting, reducing costs and possibly 
lowering barriers for smaller parties to reach the electorate.30    With a shift away from mass 
                                                          
27 Bartlett et al., ibid, p 33.   
28 WA Gorton ‘Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms 
Democracy’ (2016) 38(1) New Political Science 61, 70.   
29 For a discussion see: FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, J Möller, S Kruikemeier, RÓ Fathaigh, K Irion, T 
Dobber, B Bodó and C de Vreese ‘Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for Democracy’ 
(2018) 14 Utrecht Law Review 82, 84-89; B Bodó, N Helberger and CH de Vreese ‘Political micro-
targeting: a Manchurian candidate or just a dark horse?’ (2017) 6(4) Internet Policy Review available at 
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/political-micro-targeting-manchurian-candidate-or-just-dark-
horse. 
30 Cf. N Anstead ‘Data-Driven Campaigning in the 2015 United Kingdom General Election’ (2017) 22(3) 
The International Journal of Press Politics 294, 308.   
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media, political campaigns may also become more diverse, as parties seek to engage voters on 
issues which previously had been regarded as of marginal relevance.  Indeed, one of the lauded 
benefits of social media platforms (SMPs) is their facilitating the greater participation of 
individuals in political campaigns, and a wider prevalence of ‘satellite campaigns’ advocating 
particular electoral outcomes while being outside the control of the political parties themselves.31  
Voters in turn may become more engaged and likely to vote as campaign messages are tailored 
more effectively to their interests and concerns.  Taken together, such effects may lead to greater 
electoral participation.   
 
According to Gorton, given the ability of microtargeting to alter voter behaviour, citizens 
become ‘potential objects of control rather than autonomous political actors’.32  Even if this is 
true, of more concern is the effect this could have on public discourse; the ability to segment 
voters and target individualised messages may lead to a fragmentation of political debate, and a 
polarisation of the electorate.33   
 
For a number of years now, partly because of their commercial models, concern has been 
expressed that the use of online intermediaries can lead to the related phenomena of ‘filter 
                                                          
31 For a discussion see K Dommett and L Temple ‘Digital Campaigning: The Rise of Facebook and 
Satellite Campaigns’ (2018) 71 Parliamentary Affairs 189.   
32 Gorton, above n 28, p 63.   
33 D Kreiss ‘Yes We Can (Profile You): A Brief Primer on Campaigns and Political Data’ (2012) 64 Stan L 
Rev Online 70, 74; Gorton, above n28, p 63; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., above n 29, p 87; CoE report, 
above n 2,  p 18.   
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bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’.34  It is true to say that the evidence is ambiguous.35  Some have 
found some modest effects,36 while others have found vulnerable users may be particularly 
susceptible.37  In any event, filter bubbles are materially different from political microtargeting.  
The former is a product of the platforms’ algorithms, optimising the salience of messages in 
order to maximise commercial gains from advertising.  The latter is concerned explicitly with 
selecting the relevant audience, according to their political opinions, and tailoring campaign 
messages in order to influence their voting intentions.   
 
Traditionally, the electorate have tended to gather information via the mass media, whereas 
microtargeting offers the ability to tailor (unmediated) messages to voters according to their pre-
                                                          
34 C Sunstein Republic.Com 2.0 (New York: Princeton UP, 2009); For a literature review see FJ 
Zuiderveen Borgesius, D Trilling, J Moeller, B Bodó, CH de Vreese, and N Helberger ‘Should We Worry 
About Filter Bubbles?’ (2016) 5(1) Internet Policy Review available at https://policyreview.info/ 
35 For a review of the evidence see: D Spohr ‘Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and 
selective exposure on social media’ (2017) 34(3) Business Information Review 150.  Some question 
whether there is robust empirical evidence that filter bubbles can shape voter preferences: Zuiderveen 
Borgesius et al., n 29 above; E Dubois and G Blank ‘The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating 
effect of political interest and diverse media’ (2018) 21(5) Information, Communication & Society 729.   
36 S Flaxman, S Goel and JM Rao ‘Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption’ 
(2016) 80(1) Public Opinion Quarterly 298; R Fletcher and RK Nielsen ‘Are people incidentally exposed to 
news on social media? A comparative analysis’ (2018) 20(7) New Media & Society 2450; M Gentzkow 
and JM Shapiro ‘Ideological Segregation Online and Offline’ (2011) 126(4) The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1799.   
37 WH Dutton and L Fernandez ‘How Susceptible Are Internet Users? (2019) 46(4) Intermedia 36. 
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existing political preferences and biases.38  This has the potential to fragment the public sphere 
by reducing the opportunities for voters to engage in a shared public discourse.39  Instead of 
promoting a common conversation, campaigns tend to focus on ‘wedge issues’ – the promotion 
of emotive and superficial matters – which may distort public debate and lead to greater 
insularity.40   
 
Furthermore, as targeting becomes more efficient, there is an increased tendency to focus on 
those voters who are most useful to the campaign, excluding others.  For this reason, 
microtargeting is particularly effective in first-past-the-post electoral systems where resources 
tend to be focused on key marginal seats.41  ‘Political redlining’ is a technique employed by 
campaigns where they concentrate on ‘swing’ voters in target constituencies, ignoring others 
who are likely to support opposing parties, or are least likely to vote.42  The danger is this 
exacerbates pre-existing political inequalities by ignoring voters who are least likely to be 
                                                          
38 Gorton, above n 28, p 71.   
39 IS Rubinstein ‘Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data’ (2014) 5 Wis L Rev 861, 910; Anstead, above n 30, 
pp 308-309. 
40 Rubinstein, ibid, p 909; CoE report, above n 2,  p 18. 
41 However, there is evidence that microtargeting it has been used successfully in countries which have 
proportional representation electoral systems, see: Kruschinski and Haller, above n 14; M Magin, N 
Podschuweit, J Haßler and U Russmann ‘Campaigning in the fourth age of political communication’ 
(2017) 20(11) Information, Communication & Society 1698. 
42 The term was coined by P Howard New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen (Cambridge: CUP, 
2006). 
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engaged.43  Microtargeting may also lead to the suppression of voter turnout for opposing 
campaigns;44 a practice referred to as ‘digital gerrymandering’.45  While negative campaigning is 
not new, the increased efficiency of microtargeting increases the adverse consequences in terms 
of voter disengagement.   
 
Another issue relates to the power of the intermediaries.  In recent years, as politicians have 
realised the advantages of digital marketing, there has been a significant growth in big data 
experts and consultancies upon whom parties are reliant.  Platforms themselves have developed 
services which are closely integrated with political parties’ campaign teams,46 controlling access 
to the electorate with which political parties wish to communicate, their data, and targeting 
campaign tools.47  Facebook, in particular, appears to be emerging as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for 
services related to microtargeting.48  There are a number of possible dangers as intermediaries 
                                                          
43 There is also some evidence that since it is rational to focus on those more likely to vote (especially 
older voters), it may have the consequence of leading to great voter disengagement in the longer-term (K 
Endres and KJ Kelly ‘Does microtargeting matter? Campaign contact strategies and young voters' (2018) 
28(1) Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 1). 
44 Rubinstein, above n 39, pp 908-909.   
45 EDPS report, above n 7, p 13.   
46 For a discussion of the US see: D Kreiss and SC McGregor ‘Technology Firms Shape Political 
Communication: The Work of Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google With Campaigns During the 2016 
US Presidential Cycle’ (2017) Political Communication 1; DW Nickerson and T Rogers ‘Political 
Campaigns and Big Data’ (2014) 28(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 51. 
47 CoE report, above n 2,  p 18.   
48 Tambini, above n 16, p 281. 
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assume an increasingly powerful role as ‘gatekeepers’ over parties’ abilities to communicate 
with voters.  In contrast to (some of) the traditional media, there is little incentive on 
intermediaries to maintain a healthy public debate or a level playing field for political parties; 
‘political audiences are ultimately sold to the highest bidder’.49  Another area for caution is the 
ability an intermediary has to refuse to deal with political parties whose viewpoints run counter 
to its own ideological standpoint.50  One related area of disquiet is ‘political capture’.  As 
politicians decide upon the regulatory environment in which intermediaries operate, the latter’s 
increasing potential to shape electoral outcomes, in a setting which lacks transparency and public 
scrutiny, may result in the emergence of more favourable rules across all the spheres of their 
commercial activity, not simply those relating to political advertising.51  Conversely, a party 
which advocates greater regulation that is likely to damage the commercial interests of 
intermediaries may be discriminated against.52   
 
Of all the possible risks from microtargeting, the most serious is the distortion of the democratic 
process by undermining public discourse.  It may do this in two key ways.  First, the collection 
and use of data may have a ‘chilling effect’ on voters’ behaviour online, deterring them from 
expressing their opinions freely.53  Second, microtargeting may bypass the traditional media, 
                                                          
49 Bobo et al., above n 29; Kreiss and McGregor, above n 46, p 4.   
50 Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., above n 29, p 89.  There is anecdotal evidence from a former Facebook 
employee claiming to have been involved in suppressing conservative issues from trending on the 
platform in the US (CoE report, above n 2,  p 18). 
51 Kreiss and McGregor, above n 46, pp 4-5. 
52 Tambini, above n 16, p 282.   
53 EDPS report, above n 7, p 9; Kreiss, above n 33, p 71; Rubinstein, above n 39, pp 905-907.   
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with political messages reaching voters without being mediated in any meaningful way;54 
whereas previously a campaign may be deterred from propagating false or misleading 
information due to the potential adverse reputational effects; as messages become more targeted 
and differentiated, misleading information is less likely to be exposed.  As Gorton cautions 
‘microtargeting produces messages that can more easily fly under the radar of the press and the 
broader public, markedly increasing their power to mislead and misinform viewers with 
impunity’.55   
 
The lack of transparency relating to the origin of an advertisement is likely to compound this 
problem.  A ‘dark ad’ is a paid-for political message where only the publisher of the 
advertisement and the individual(s) targeted can see the message (unless she chooses to share the 
message with others), thus making it difficult to hold campaigners to account for any false or 
misleading information, and facilitating contradictory messages or policy claims.  The term is 
also used to describe the situation where the target audience are unable to determine the 
provenance of the message and whether or not is it paid for.  Conversely, technologies such as 
‘bots’ can be used to artificially increase the apparent popularity of SMP accounts from which 
messages are sent, and fake accounts and paid trolls may also be used to deceive voters about the 
true level of a campaign’s support (so-called ‘astroturfing’56).   
 
 
                                                          
54 CoE report, above n 2, p 19 
55 Gorton, above n28, p 72.   
56 ELC, above n 3, para 24. 
 17 
 
3. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME FOR THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL 
ADVERTISING 
 
This section gives a brief overview of the current rules which seek to control political 
advertising.  First, there are controls on campaign expenditure which limit advertising spending 
by political parties and others.  Second, the UK has maintained a longstanding prohibition of 
political advertising on television and radio.  Third, the ‘imprint’ requirement, which currently 
applies only to printed materials, aims to increase the transparency of political advertising. 
 
(a) Campaign expenditure rules57 
 
Electoral law sets limits on the amount of money campaigners can spend on campaigns.  There 
are two key pieces of legislation.  Individual candidates’ expenditure is governed by the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 (RPA).  The spending limits at constituency level are 
relatively low.58  For this reason, parties would normally prefer to report advertising spending 
under the more generous national spending limits, even where a limited number of marginal 
seats are targeted.   
 
National campaign expenditure, the focus here, is governed by the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), which also set up the ELC.  Before PPERA there were no 
                                                          
57 The following is limited to elections to the UK Parliament and national referendums.   
58 For the 2017 general election this was set at £8,700 plus 6-9 pence per registered parliamentary 
elector. 
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restrictions on national spending.  The ELC has civil sanctions for unlawful behaviour, including 
fines (up to a maximum of £20,000).  However, criminal offences can only be pursued by the 
police.59  The ELC’s principal role is to enforce the reporting requirements for campaigners and 
ensure spending limits are not exceeded.  Spending limits apply to expenditure during the 
‘regulated period’ preceding the vote (eg, 12 months for the UK parliamentary elections, four 
months in respect of the 2016 EU referendum).  The spending limit for a party contesting all UK 
parliamentary seats would be £19.5 million.60 
 
In terms of national spending for the 2017 general election, of a total expenditure by registered 
parties of £39,147,932, around a quarter (£10,052,016) was directly attributable to 
‘advertising’,61 though this may be an understatement as advertising expenditure (including 
digital campaign spending) may fall within other reportable categories.62   
 
                                                          
59 The powers of the Electoral Commission were augmented by Political Parties and Election Act 2009. 
60 ie, £30,000 for each seat (PPERA, Schedule 9).   
61 This data was extracted from the ELC’s online database of political spending: 
http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/Search/Spending?currentPage=1&rows=20&sort=TotalExpendit
ure&order=desc&tab=1&et=pp&includeOutsideSection75=true&evt=ukparliament&ev=3568&optCols=Exp
enseCategoryName&optCols=AmountInEngland&optCols=AmountInScotland&optCols=AmountInWales&
optCols=AmountInNorthernIreland&optCols=DatePaid 
62 Particularly, ‘Market research/canvassing’ (£7,364,272) and ‘Unsolicited material to electors’ 
(£13,402,325). 
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Third party spending is also regulated by PPERA.63  Where a non-party campaigner spends over 
a prescribed limit within the ‘regulated period’ (£20,000 in England), with the purpose of 
promoting particular candidates and/or policies aimed at influencing the outcome of an election, 
they must register with the ELC and comply with its reporting requirements on spending.64  Non-
party campaigners are only entitled to register if they are based in the UK; those not entitled to 
register must not spend above the prescribed spending limits.   
 
Referendum spending under the EU referendum was also governed under PPERA.65  Here the 
ELC designated two lead campaign groups which were each subject to a spending limit of £7 
million.  Other registered campaigners (those spending over £10,000) were permitted to spend up 
to £700,000.  Political parties were also entitled to register with the ELC provided they specified 
the outcome they were campaigning for; spending limits were based on the proportion of the 
vote in the preceding general election.66   
 
In addition to spending, PPERA also put in place restrictions on donations and loans to political 
organisations (in both elections and referendums), which generally must originate with a person 
or organisation from the UK (where the amount exceeds £500).  The ELC referred two 
                                                          
63 Significant changes were made under the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and 
Trade Union Administration Act 2014.   
64 The limits for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are £10,000.   
65 Specific rules were implemented under the European Union Referendum Act 2015.   
66 eg, the Labour Party had a spending limit of £5.5m (based on 29% of the vote in the 2015 general 
election).  The Conservative Party did not register a preferred outcome so was not entitled to spend on 
the campaign.   
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individuals to the National Crime Agency concerning alleged offences relating to illegal sources 
of funding and loans in the EU referendum.67 
 
In terms of spending on digital advertising, the ELC noted social media had been used 
extensively in the EU referendum campaign, following the trend in the 2015 general election.68  
Digital advertising spend (as a share of total advertising spend) has increased rapidly over the 
last decade: from 0.3 per cent in 2011, to at least 42.8 per cent in 2017.69   
 
(b) The prohibition on broadcast political advertising 
 
The regulation of political advertising in the UK is the subject of a strict dichotomy; a complete 
ban with respect to broadcasting, and little or no regulation of everything else. 
 
The statutory prohibition (now contained in the Communications Act 2003)70 has been in place 
since 1954 (the beginning of commercial television).  It applies not only to organisations which 
                                                          
67 ELC Report on investigation into payments made to Better for the Country and Leave.EU (1 November 
2018). 
68 ELC Report on the regulation of campaigners at the referendum on the UK’s membership of the 
European Union held on 23 June 2016 (March 2017) p 41.  For further evidence of a substantial shift 
away from spending on traditional advertising to social media (in particular, Facebook), see: Tambini, 
above n 16, p 278 (on the EU referendum), and Anstead, above n 30 (on the 2015 general election).   
69 ELC, above n 3, p 4, chart 1.  This is likely to be under-reported as it refers only to direct expenditure 
on digital platforms.   
70 Communications Act 2003, ss 319(2)(g) and 321(2).   
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have political objectives, but all advertisements which have a ‘political end’, which has a very 
broad definition including influencing public opinion on a matter ‘public controversy’.71  
Broadcasters are, however, required to offer some campaigners free party political broadcasts.72   
The UK’s prohibition has been challenged, most notably in Animal Defenders International 
(ADI) v UK (the ‘ADI case’),73 where the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘the Court’) upheld the ban (by a majority of nine to eight).74  This case is particularly 
pertinent for the future regulation of digital political advertising as the Court held a general 
prohibition may be permissible where less restrictive means of controlling advertising could lead 
to uncertainty or abuse.75  This point is elaborated upon below.   
 
                                                          
71 Communications Act 2003, s 321(3)(f).   
72 Communications Act 2003, s 333.  The right to a party political broadcast extends only to parties 
registered with the ELC, and referendum broadcasts are only made available to the designated lead 
campaigners (PPERA, ss 37 and 127, respectively).   
73 (2013) 57 EHRR 21.   
74 For a discussion see T Lewis ‘Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom: sensible dialogue or a 
bad case of Strasbourg jitters?’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 460; J Rowbottom ‘Animal Defenders International: 
speech, spending, and a change of direction in Strasbourg’ (2013) 5(1) JML 1.   The ban was challenged 
before the House of Lords (R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 1 AC 1312) (for a discussion see T Lewis and P 
Cumper ‘Balancing freedom of political expression against equality of political opportunity’ [2009] PL 89).   
75 There were several cases decided before ADI which appeared to suggest a general prohibition could 
not be justified (especially, VgT Verien gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (2002) 34 EHRR 4 and TV Vest 
As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway (2008) 48 EHRR 1206).  The former case caused particular 
problems for the Government during the passage of the Communications Bill (Lewis, ibid, p 464).   
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(c) The current ‘imprint’ requirement 
 
At present, there is a requirement for an ‘imprint’ to appear on all printed election materials, 
ranging from unsolicited mail to newspaper advertisements.76  The imprint requirement serves 
two key purposes.  First and foremost, it enables voters to judge the provenance and credibility 
of campaign materials.  Second, it assists the ELC in monitoring and enforcing electoral 
spending rules.   
 
‘Election material’ has a very broad meaning, defined as ‘material which can reasonably be 
regarded as intended to promote or procure electoral success’ of particular political parties or 
their candidates.77  It may include the advocacy of particular policies without mention of a 
particular candidate/party,78 or material ‘prejudicing the electoral prospects at the election of 
other parties or candidates’.79  The ‘imprint’ must specify ‘the name and address of the promoter 
of the material’, and (where not the promoter) the name and address of any person on behalf of 
whom the material is being published.80  It applies to all materials, not merely those of 
campaigners registered with the ELC, and there are no minimum spending thresholds.  The rule’s 
                                                          
76 The rule applies to both candidates and to political parties and registered third party campaigners 
(RPA, s.110 and PPERA, s 143).  As the rules are substantially aligned, the following focuses on the 
PPERA requirements only.   
77 PPERA, s 143A(1).  This provision has not been commenced for Northern Ireland.   
78 PPERA, s 143A(1)(b) 
79 PPERA, s 143A(2)(b) 
80 PPERA, s 143(2).  The name and address of the printer of the material must also be included.   
 23 
 
application is not limited to the registered period.81  Printed materials in referendum campaigns 
are subject to similar requirements.82  The ELC has used its civil enforcement powers to enforce 
the imprint requirement,83 although failure to comply also attracts criminal liability.84 
 
In summary, the current electoral rules which govern political advertising are in need of reform 
to reflect the challenges of the digital environment.  First, digital advertising expenditure has 
increased rapidly, but it is difficult to monitor directly given the opaque reporting requirements.  
Second, the ban on broadcast advertising is increasingly difficult to justify given the shift of 
campaigning to the online environment.  Third, the imprint requirement does not apply to digital 
election materials, leaving a serious gap in the electoral rules.  The following section now 
considers how these problems and others can and should be dealt with.   
 
4. THE OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
This section explains the potential reforms to electoral law to deal with the challenges of digital 
campaigning, especially those arising from the use of microtargeting.  First considered are 
relatively modest changes to the reporting of campaign expenditure, to enable the ELC to 
monitor and capture all of the attendant costs of digital campaigning.  One live controversy is 
                                                          
81 PPERA, s.143A(4). 
82 PPERA, s 126. 
83 There were 14 cases investigated between 2012 and 2018, see: 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/151659/Cases-publication.pdf.   
84 PPERA, s143; RPA, s 110. 
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foreign spending on campaigns, and the apparent gaps in the present regime to deal with it 
effectively.  Second, are two measures which are aimed at increasing transparency; a digital 
imprint requirement, and online repositories for campaign messages.  Third, and more radical, is 
the possibility of placing substantive restrictions on microtargeting.  These range from modest 
interventions (eg, stopping lookalike profiling) to a complete prohibition of targeting.  As is 
discussed below, placing limits on political advertising will need to be carefully calibrated with 
Article 10 (ECHR).  Another possible means of mitigating some of the harms of microtargeting 
is to regulate the ‘truthfulness’ of content.  Finally, some of the issues around regulatory design 
need to be confronted.   
 
(a) Reforming spending rules 
 
The ELC has made a number of proposals to both increase the transparency of spending on 
digital campaigning, and to ensure all associated costs are captured.85  First, it argues for greater 
specificity in reporting.  One particular problem is securing a correct division of spending 
between local and national campaigns. Clearly there is an incentive to report expenditure against 
the national spending limit, which is considerably higher, but digital communications are often 
focused on swing voters in marginal seats.  To address this issue, the ELC proposes more 
specific information including on the messages used, the amount spent on each campaign, and 
which parts of the country the message was targeted at.86  Spending categories would also need 
                                                          
85 See also DCMSC interim report, above n 4, para 48.   
86 ELC, above n 3, para 50.  
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to be revised, as PPERA currently contains no separate category for digital spend.87  A second 
reform is to revise the rules to capture all digital campaigning costs.  One seeming anomaly is 
money spent by political parties (and lead referendum campaigns) on direct staff costs not 
counting towards spending limits.88  It is clear parties have used permanent employees, and have 
taken on additional staff or consultants, at significant cost, for their digital campaigns.89  The 
ELC also stress that the spending limits do currently include all the costs of developing and using 
databases; this applies even if the original purchase of hardware and software falls outside the 
regulated period.90  The ELC notes that resources are needed to make and manage databases of 
supporters which can in turn lead to organic reach; these costs should count towards spending 
limits.91  So too the costs of bots and paid trolls.92   
 
                                                          
87 Spending could be ‘hidden’ in other categories of spending (such as advertising agencies, market 
research etc) (CoE report, above n 2,  p 17; UCL Constitution Unit Report of the Independent 
Commission on Referendums (July 2018) (hereafter ‘ICR’) para 14.16).   
88 ELC, above n 3, para 67.  It does count towards non-party campaigners and candidates’ spending 
limits.   
89 ibid, para 68-69. 
90 ibid, para 71.  ELC is currently drafting statutory codes of practice which clarify the position, see: 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/publications/consultations-and-responses/spending-by-
candidates-and-political-parties-codes-of-practice 
91 ELC, above n 3, para 66. ‘Organic reach’ is where a campaign message or advert is received by 
supporters who share the message further with their online contacts.   
92 ELC, ibid, para 28. 
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One set of reforms the ELC has argued for relates to information and reporting requirements.  
Given the immediacy and ubiquity of digital campaigning, it stresses it needs to be able to 
investigate campaigns in ‘real time’, not just after a vote as at present.93  The reach of its powers 
to compel the provision of evidence also need to be extended to third parties, including social 
media platforms.94  Another of the major problems is the lack of effective sanctions the ELC has.  
At present, the maximum fine it can impose is £20,000 for each offence, which the ELC 
considers ‘risks becoming a cost of doing business’, with no effective deterrent value.95  This is 
particularly the case for referendums, where reputational damage is far less likely to be an issue 
for non-party campaigners.96   
 
Another particular area of concern identified by the ELC is foreign spending in UK political 
campaigns.  The only individuals or groups who can give money to parties or campaigns (or 
register as non-party campaigners) are people who live or are registered to vote in the UK and 
organisations based here.97  At the time PPERA was passed, there was limited potential for 
foreign actors to purchase campaign advertising.98  The internet has certainly made cross-border 
communication easier and cheaper for non-UK organisations.99  There exists a surprising lacuna 
                                                          
93 ELC, above n 3, para 105-106.  The ELC’s investigatory powers are enumerated in PPERA, Sch.19B.   
94 ibid, para 107. 
95 ibid, para 115.  It should be noted, however, that criminal offences can be referred to the police and on 
conviction do carry significant penalties, including potential imprisonment. 
96 ibid, para 116. 
97 PPERA, s 54 (on permissible donors to parties); PPERA, s.88 (on permissible third party campaigners).   
98 ELC, above n 3, para 87. 
99 ICR, above n 87 para 14.13; ELC, above n 3, para 84.   
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in the political finance regime: while there is a ‘general principle’ against foreign spending, there 
is no ‘explicit’ ban.100  Where a non-UK individual or organisation spends below the minimum 
levels requiring registration, there is no specific infraction of the UK electoral laws.101  Even 
were this apparent loophole to be removed, there would remain serious scope for abuse.102  
While monitoring foreign interference in political campaigns will engage the intelligence and 
security services,103 in the view of the ELC, social media platforms must put in place 
mechanisms to ensure those paying for political advertising in the UK are actually based, or 
registered to vote, here.104  As the ELC noted, such arrangements had been put in place by 
Google, Facebook and Twitter in advance of the US mid-term elections in 2018.105  While there 
were reported problems with the schemes in the US,106 Facebook has subsequently announced a 
new enhanced registration procedure which requires those placing political advertisements on its 
                                                          
100 ELC, above n 3, para 86. 
101 ibid, para 86.  The relevant minimum in the 2017 general election was £20,000 (for England).  The ICR 
makes a similar point in relation to referendums (ICR, above n 87, para 141.5).   
102 For evidence of potential/alleged Russian interference in the EU referendum see DCMSC interim 
report, above n 4, ch 5. 
103 ELC, above n 3, para 88-89. 
104 ibid, para 90. 
105 ibid.  In the Irish May 2018 referendum, Facebook banned campaigners from outside Ireland buying 
referendum adverts, and Google banned all paid adverts connected with it (ibid, para 121).   
106 A Hern and J Waterson ‘Facebook delays identity checks on UK political advertisers’ The Guardian 7 
November 2018.   
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platforms to prove they are based in the UK.107  All this points to the ELC’s increased reliance 
on intermediaries to ensure UK spending restrictions are enforced.   
 
(b) Extending the imprint requirement to digital media 
 
The apparently simple proposal to extend the ‘imprint’ rule to digital media has gained 
increasing traction.108  It represents a longstanding policy of the ELC, was recommended by the 
Law Commission (LC) in 2016,109 received the broad support of the DCMSC,110 and the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life endorsed the reform.111  Arising out of the Government’s 
                                                          
107 A Hern ‘Facebook to require proof that political ads come from UK’ The Guardian 29 November 2018.  
The information includes proof of UK (or EU) nationality (eg. a passport) and a UK postal address, 
Facebook ‘Getting authorised to run ads related to politics or issues of national importance’ (no date): 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051 
108 The Secretary of State has a power to extend the imprint rule to digital media (PPERA, s 143(6)). 
109 Law Commission, Scottish Law Commission, Northern Ireland Law Commission, Electoral Law: A 
Joint Interim Report (4 February 2016), p 156 available at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-
prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2016/02/electoral_law_interim_report.pdf.  The LC was only 
considering reform to RPA (it determined that PPERA and national campaign rules would not form part of 
its review given the politically contentious nature of the issues).   
110 DCMSC final report, above n 4, para 211.  Baroness O’Neill has introduced a Private Members Bill 
which requires the Government to extend the imprint requirement to digital communications, see: 
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/electionsandreferendumsadvertising.html 
111 Committee on Standards in Public Life Intimidation in Public Life Cm 9543, December 2017, p 61. 
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response to the latter’s report, the Cabinet Office launched a consultation on the issue,112 and a 
response to the consultation in May 2019.113   
 
The key challenge is to create a requirement which promotes transparency, while not having a 
chilling effect on online political discourse by ordinary citizens.114  Previous experience has 
demonstrated the difficulties in striking the appropriate balance.  The Scottish Parliament had 
introduced a digital imprint rule for the independence referendum in 2014.115  While the 
intention was for the rule to apply only to campaigners, not individuals expressing personal 
opinions over social media, there was considerable confusion over its scope.116  The problem 
appeared to stem from the broad definition given to qualifying materials (those ‘relating to’ the 
referendum), rather than the narrower formulation used for print (those ‘reasonably regarded’ to 
                                                          
112 Cabinet Office, Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information: Responding to electoral 
recommendations and issues raised in the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s report on Intimidation 
in Public Life (July 2018) pp 40-50.   
113 Cabinet Office Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information, Government response (2 
May 2019) pp 32-37 (hereafter ‘Government response’).   
114 Electoral Reform Society, Protecting the Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information: consultation 
response (18 October 2018). 
115 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 (Scotland), Sch 4, para 27.   
116 ELC Scottish Independence Referendum (ELC/2014/02, December 2014) pp 110-111. 
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intend to promote or procure a particular outcome).117  While the LC advocates the latter 
approach, in addition it suggests a ‘reasonably practicable’ defence for digital media.118   
 
The Government’s consultation raised a number of other issues.  Recognising the dangers of 
over-inclusiveness, it floated the option of a spending threshold119 and suggested the digital 
imprint requirement should not apply outside of the regulated period, as is the case for the print 
equivalent.120  The Government now appears to favour parity with the imprint rule in these two 
respects.121  It also posed the question of whether certain types of digital messaging ought to be 
prioritised over others.122  No firm decision has been taken on this, though it observes that a 
differentiated approach may result in confusion.123   
 
The issue of who should bear the responsibility for including an imprint, and liability for failing 
to do so, also needs to be settled.124  The potential addressees of a digital imprint rule could 
include, in the context of a ‘tweet’: the creator of the material, the advertising agency, the 
                                                          
117 Cabinet Office, above n 112, para 10.39. 
118 LC, above n 109, para 11.76. For example, the requirement could be satisfied by including the imprint 
in the SMP biography rather than in the message itself.  PPERA contains such a defence for the current 
imprint rule (s 143(10)). 
119 Cabinet Office, above n 112, para 10.33.   
120 ibid, p 46, Question 28.   
121 Government response, n 113 above, pp 33-34.   
122 Cabinet Office, above n 112, paras 10.44-10.45.   
123 Government response, n 113 above, p 34.   
124 Cabinet Office, above n 112, para 10.48.   
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original tweeter, or an individual retweeting the message.125  Again the Government appears to 
be equivocating on this issue, noting the tension between ensuring that any rule promotes 
transparency for voters while not stifling the debate.126 
 
The consultation also asked for views on the form an imprint should take, especially whether the 
imprint should appear as a ‘pop up and hover’ text, on the message itself, or whether inclusion of 
the author of the material on their social media ‘bio’ would be sufficient.127  The Government 
again appears to be postponing any real engagement with these difficult questions, stating only 
that any rule would need to be platform neutral.128   
 
Clearly the issue of enforceability needs to be considered, given the ubiquity of social media.  In 
response to the LC’s consultation, it is noteworthy that the Association of Chief Police Officers 
entered serious reservations over the feasibility of a digital imprint rule.129  The ELC suggested 
criminal liability ought not to attach to non-compliance, though the LC demurred.130  The 
Government did not engage meaningfully with the question of enforcement, beyond asking 
                                                          
125 ibid, p 48, Question 33.   
126 Government response, n 113 above, p 36.   
127 Cabinet Office, above n 112, para 10.46, Questions 30 and 31.  The DCMSC has encouraged the 
government to consider the feasibility of ‘clear, persistent banners on all paid-for political adverts and 
videos’, indicating their source (DCMSC final report, above n 4, para 211).   
128 Government response, n 113 above, p 35.   
129 LC, above n 109, para 11.74. 
130 ibid, para 11.81.   
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whether current enforcement powers are sufficient.131  In its response to the consultation, the 
Government merely noted that substantial fines could be a means of ensuring compliance.132  
Perhaps the major impediment to effective implementation of any digital imprint rule will be the 
enforcement resources available to the ELC (and the police).   
 
There are clearly a number of difficulties in applying an imprint rule to digital communications 
and any regime would need to be ‘future-proofed in expectation of developments in media and 
technology’.133  Whilst the Government appears to be asking (some of) the right questions, 
providing clear answers on appropriate rule design is proving problematic, and it is obvious a 
simple read across of the print rule is not appropriate, especially if priority is given to the need to 
protect political discourse online.  Furthermore, while compliance among those who are 
registered with the ELC may well be high, there remain serious enforcement issues where 
organisations outside of the UK seek to influence campaigns.   
 
The debate over digital imprints is not limited to the UK.  Similar proposals have been 
considered in the US, with the introduction of bipartisan legislation (the ‘Honest Ads Act’) into 
Congress.134  The US Federal Election Commission (FEC) has also launched a consultation on 
                                                          
131 Cabinet Office, above n 112, p 49, Question 34. 
132 Government response, n 113 above, p 37.   
133 Cabinet Office, above n 112, p 47, Question 32. 
134 See https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1989/text.  Proposals for similar 
legislation in Ireland have recently stalled (M O'Halloran ‘Government defeated on online advertising and 
social media Bill’ (The Irish Times, 14 December 2018)). 
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extending imprint requirement to online advertisements.135  The EU’s Code of Practice likewise 
advocates increasing transparency, requiring ‘public disclosure of political advertising’ online,136 
though it also notes the need to avoid restrictions on political discussion or the publication of 
public opinion.137  What is significant is the response of the social media platforms.  It appears 
the threat of legislation has resulted in both Facebook and Twitter implementing an imprint 
requirement in the US,138 and this has been extended by Facebook to the UK (using the US term 
‘disclaimer’, rather than imprint).139  Perhaps this may yield more evidence on how to design a 
digital imprint rule which does not have the paradoxical effect of suppressing democratic 
discourse online.   
 
(c) Database(s) of microtargeted advertisements 
 
The provision of an online repository is a further initiative aimed at increasing the transparency 
of digital advertising.  According to the Independent Commission on Referendums (ICR), such a 
                                                          
135 For background see https://www.fec.gov/updates/nprm-internet-communication-disclaimers-definition-
public-communication-2018/ 
136 EU CoP, above n 6, II.B.3. 
137 ibid, II.B.4. 
138 S Wang, ‘Twitter Follows Facebook in Endorsing Senate’s ‘Honest Ads’ Act’ (Bloomberg.com 10 April 
2018) available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-10/twitter-follows-facebook-in-
endorsing-senate-s-honest-ads-act 
139 Facebook ‘How disclaimers work for ads related to politics or issues of national importance’ (no date): 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/198009284345835.  For a fuller explanation of industry 
initiatives, see EU CoP, above n 6, Annex 2. 
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database would serve two purposes: first, it would enable the ELC to assess online spending and 
identify any discrepancies in spending returns; and, second, it would increase the accountability 
of campaigns, exposing instances where contradictory messages are being targeted at different 
groups or where adverts are using inappropriate or harmful messages.140 
 
Social media companies have already committed to doing this individually, as part of their 
initiatives to tackle ‘dark ads’.141  For example, Facebook has put in place a repository for 
advertisements served over its platform which are ‘related to politics or issues of national 
importance and target the UK’;142 those which do not carry ‘disclaimers’ and are reported by 
users to be of a political nature will also be added to the database.143  While this may increase the 
transparency of online campaigning, the database will only carry limited information on 
                                                          
140 ICR, above n 87, para 14.38. 
141 A Hern and J Waterson ‘Facebook cracks down on ‘dark ads’ by British political groups’ The Guardian, 
16 Oct 2018. 
142 Facebook ‘About the Ad Library’ (no date) available at 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/2405092116183307 
143 Facebook ‘How are ads related to politics and national issues identified on Facebook?’ (no date) 
available at https://www.facebook.com/help/180607332665293.   
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targeting.144  The EU code would appear to require more, stipulating that users should be given 
information ‘to understand why they have been targeted by a given advertisement’.145   
 
While the platforms’ moves to create repositories of political advertisements has been welcomed, 
a number of bodies and organisations have questioned whether this can be an effective substitute 
for a central public register.  The ICR points to possible problems if each platform follows its 
own approach, with the resulting information being ‘confusing and disjointed’.146  Instead, it 
stresses the need for coordination and cooperation between firms, government, parliament and 
the regulators.147  The DCMSC, which supports calls for an independent public register,148 also 
suggests the Government should impose ‘transparency requirements’ on SMPs, ensuring data on 
political advertising ‘are clear and easily searchable, and identify the source, explaining who 
                                                          
144 The information will include: the number of ‘impressions’ (as a range); the amount spent (as a range); 
demographic information (age and gender); and the location of those who viewed the ads.  Other 
platforms are reported to be planning similar measures (Hern and Waterson, above n 141); for 
information on Twitter see: https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Providing-More-
Transparency-Around-Advertising-on-Twitter.html 
145 EU CoP, above n 6, II.B. 
146 ICR, above n 87, para 14.12. 
147 ibid, para 14.43. 
148 DCMSC interim report, above n 4, para 142; DCMSC final report, above n 4, para 215.   
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uploaded it, who sponsored it, and its country of origin’.149  The ELC welcomes the initiatives of 
the platforms, although it appears less committed to a central register.150   
 
(d) Restricting digital campaigning 
 
This brief section, in the light of there being no case in point, discusses the principles enunciated 
by the Court in the ADI case and others, and the extent to which it is possible to place restrictions 
on microtargeting consistent with freedom of political expression under Article 10.151  It then 
goes on to reflect upon some of the restrictions which could be placed on digital campaigning, 
including microtargeting.   
 
(i) FREEDOM OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND THE STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE 
 
As the Court has confirmed on numerous occasions, political expression, including advertising, 
benefits from the highest level of protection under Article 10,152 with States enjoying a narrow 
margin of appreciation in determining whether a restriction is necessary to address a pressing 
                                                          
149 DCMSC interim report, ibid, para 144.  The ICR stresses that any database would need to be 
searchable and have detailed comprehensive information (ICR, above n 87 para 14.39).   
150 ELC, above n 3, para 61. 
151 For a fuller exposition and critique of the Court’s case law see Rowbottom, above n 74; Lewis, above n 
74.   
152 TV Vest, above n 75, [66]. 
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social need.153  Clearly, any restrictions on targeted advertising is likely to engage Article 10.154  
Nevertheless, the Court has repeatedly stated that restrictions on political advertising are 
permissible to prevent a distortion of the democratic process.155   
 
One of the crucial issues in the ADI case concerned the availability of less restrictive means in 
the alternative to a general prohibition on political advertising over broadcast media.  First, the 
Court was persuaded, in determining the proportionality of a measure, it must ‘primarily assess 
the legislative choices underlying it’.156  Second, in the context of prohibition, it was appropriate 
for a State to ‘take into account the risk of abuse if a general measure were to be relaxed’.157  
Further, where a relaxation would ‘give rise to a risk of significant uncertainty, of litigation, 
                                                          
153 ADI, above n 73, [101]. 
154 Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., above n 29, p 92.  Article 10 protects ‘the means of transmission or 
reception since any restriction imposed on the means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and 
impart information’ (Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) 12 EHRR 485 [47]).   
155 TV Vest, above n 75, [70]; VgT, above n 75, [73].   
156 ADI, above n 73, [108] and [114-116].   
157 ibid, [108].  The risk of abuse in this context was relaxation of the prohibition, to allow political 
advertising by social advocacy groups outside of an election period might give rise to the risk that 
‘wealthy bodies with agendas being fronted by social advocacy groups created for that precise purpose’, 
thereby circumventing the financial caps on advertising (ibid, [122]).  This is something of a false 
argument since expenditure outside of the regulated period does not count towards party election 
expenditure.   
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expense and delay, as well as of discrimination and arbitrariness’,158 these were factors relevant 
to the UK’s assessment of whether a general measure was preferable.159   
 
One of the arguments in favour of the prohibition turned on the particular potency of 
broadcasting advertising relative to other forms, including online.  The Court accepted the 
differential treatment of broadcasting still to be logically cogent, recognising ‘the immediate and 
powerful effect of the broadcast media, an impact reinforced by the continuing function of radio 
and television as familiar sources of entertainment in the intimacy of the home’.160  In contrast, 
‘the choices inherent in the use of the internet and social media mean that the information 
emerging therefrom does not have the same synchronicity or impact as broadcasted 
information’.161   
 
Whether the Court’s observations on the relative power of broadcasting advertising stand up to 
scrutiny, both then and now, is a matter of debate.  As early as 1998, the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life (the ‘Neill Committee’) noted the advent of the internet and digital 
communications could render the broadcasting ban out of date.162  However, rather than 
justifying its removal, the Committee called for the legislation governing political advertising on 
                                                          
158 ibid, [108] (authorities omitted).   
159 ibid, [108 and 110]. 
160 ibid, [119] (authorities omitted). 
161 ibid, [119].  See also R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport [2008] UKHL 15 [30] per Lord Bingham.   
162 Neill Committee, above n 1, para 13.35.  It recommended that the ELC keep the rules under constant 
review (ibid, 183, Recommendation 97).   
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broadcast media to be reviewed ‘to ensure that its reach is sufficiently wide to block attempts at 
evasion by new modes of communication’.163  More recently the ICR suggested social media 
may have overtaken broadcasting as the most influential form of media, it being ‘far from clear 
that social media lack “intimacy” or that exposure to advertising online is a matter of consumer 
choice’.164  So if a ban can be justified when broadcasting was the most influential media, why 
cannot the same be true in principle for its successor? 
 
The immediate problem with applying the reasoning of the Court in ADI to digital campaigning 
is its apparent inconsistency with previous case law, especially the TV Vest judgment.165  
Nevertheless, the Court has accepted States may impose restrictions on political advertising to 
protect the integrity of the democratic process.  While the rights to both freedom of expression 
and free elections, ‘form the bedrock of any democratic system’ and are ‘inter-related and 
operate to reinforce each other’,166 the Court has acknowledged there are certain circumstances 
where the ‘two rights may come into conflict and it may be considered necessary, in the period 
preceding or during an election, to place certain restrictions, of a type which would not usually 
be acceptable, on freedom of expression’.167   
                                                          
163 ibid, p 176, Recommendation 94.  For a similar view see Rowbottom, above n 74, pp 12-13. 
164 ICR, above n 87 para 14.35. 
165 Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., above n 29, p 94.  The facts of the TV Vest, above n 75, were very close 
to those of ADI.  The former involved the application of a general broadcast ban to a small political party, 
vitiating the justification for the measure, namely to prevent a potential distortion of the democratic 
process by powerful financial interests.   
166 Bowman v UK (1998) ECHR 4 [42].   
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Further, as the ADI case demonstrates, in judging the necessity of a restriction, the Court has had 
regard to the potential for abuse if a less restrictive mechanism were put in its place.  So, in the 
context of microtargeting, if measures aimed to mitigate some of its harmful consequences 
proved to be unsuccessful, there is a stronger justification for more robust mechanisms (perhaps 
even a ban).  The behaviour of those who bear the responsibility for making a system work – 
especially campaigners and intermediaries – and their willingness to ensure any regulatory 
solutions are effective and workable are clearly relevant to any evaluation of whether more 
restrictive means are necessary in the future.  This raises the question of what types of further 
restrictions could be contemplated?   
 
(ii) POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS OF MICROTARGETING 
 
There a number of ways in which microtargeting could be subject to substantive restrictions in 
order to mitigate some of its more harmful potential, though there is as yet little consensus 
around any.  Notably, as an industry body, the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) has 
called for a temporary moratorium, with the prospect of an agreed minimum limit upon the 
number of voters sent an individual message.168  Explaining its reasoning, the IPA opined that 
the ‘open, collective debate’, upon which politics and the ‘public sphere’ depends, is being 
                                                          
168 DCMSC interim report, above n 4, para 141; IPA, Written evidence submitted by the Institute of 
Practitioners in Advertising (FKN0093, June 2018) para 16 available at 
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Digital,%20Culture
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circumvented by microtargeting.169  The ICR considered the idea of a total ban on online 
political advertising, as an extension of the UK’s approach to broadcast media.170  While 
restricting political speech, it observed that campaigners could still communicate with voters 
through ‘organic’ content, with online reach being determined by their level of public support 
rather than advertising spend.171  It cautioned against such a move, however, on the basis it 
would lead to disparity of treatment between print and digital advertising that would be difficult 
to justify.172  Instead it recommended a review of political advertising across all media.173   
 
The DCMSC was similarly equivocal, arguing the ELC should establish a code of practice on 
microtargeting, perhaps limiting its use, during the regulated period, to those registered with the 
ELC.174  In addition, the Committee argued the ELC (and Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO)) should consider the ‘ethics’ of SMPs selling lookalike audiences to advertisers during the 
regulated period (in particular, whether users should have the right to opt out from being 
included in lookalike profiling).175  Elsewhere it rejected an outright ban, arguing that 
microtargeting ‘when carried out in a transparent manner, can be a useful political tool’.176   
 
                                                          
169 ibid, para 14.   
170 ICR, above n 87 para 14.31. 
171 ibid, para 14.32. 
172 ibid, para 14.33. 
173 ibid, p 187, Recommendation 61. 
174 DCMSC interim report, above n 4, para 50; see also DCMSC final report, above n 4, para 216.   
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At present, it appears there is no clear appetite for substantive restrictions on microtargeting, 
though the political consensus may shift, especially if other measures aimed at its control, 
particularly those focused at increasing transparency, do not prove to be successful.  What is 
perhaps surprising at this stage is the lack of a clear signal to intermediaries that unless its 
harmful effects are mitigated, microtargeting will be curtailed.  This may blunt the potential 
leverage government and the regulators have over the industry to achieve meaningful reforms.   
 
(iii) REGULATING FOR THE ‘TRUTHFULNESS’ OF DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING 
 
One of the core objections to microtargeting is it enables campaigners to escape public scrutiny 
of the content of their political messages.  This raises the issue of whether campaign content 
should be regulated, particularly the factual basis for any underlying claims being made?177  For 
a number of years, it has been the position there is no direct regulation of the ‘truthfulness’ of 
campaign materials.178  The ELC has consistently rejected any such role for itself.179   
 
                                                          
177 The UK Statistics Authority can complain to campaigners if it thinks they have misrepresented official 
statistics in their campaign materials.   
178 Note it is an offence to make or publish a false statement of fact about the personal character or 
conduct of a candidate (RPA, s.106).  This is narrowly constructed; the provision does not reach 
allegations political in nature, and so it is not discussed further here.   
179 ELC, above n 3, para 34. 
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The Advertising Standards Agency (ASA) likewise does not have role in regulating election and 
referendum advertising180 (but it does oversee adverts relating to some non-party political 
subjects181).  Before 1999, party political advertising did fall within its remit, but some of the 
general rules did not apply, specifically those prohibiting misleading advertisements, making 
unfair comparisons or unfairly attacking or discrediting other ‘products’.  In the ASA’s opinion 
this ‘part in, part out’ approach risked bringing ‘advertising in general into disrepute with the 
public’.182  It was also concerned that, given the short campaign timeframes, it was unlikely any 
decision could be made before an election’s conclusion.183  More significant was the lack of a 
political consensus between the main parties to bring advertising wholly within the code.184 
 
The Neill Committee in 1998 ‘exhorted’ the political parties to formulate a bespoke code of 
practice, in consultation with the advertising industry, although it noted any such code would 
‘have to be robust enough to be effective in the heat of a general election campaign’.185  The 
                                                          
180 See ASA CAP Code, clause 7.1 available at 
https://www.asa.org.uk/type/non_broadcast/code_section/07.html 
181 For further background see ASA ‘Political advertising complaints’ (26 May 2016) available at 
https://www.asa.org.uk/news/political-advertising-complaints.html#.V6CoyqUUXRU. 
182 Home Office, The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom: The Government's proposals for 
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1999, para 9.8. 
183 ASA, above n 181.   
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government of the day was robust in its rejection of the (soon to be formed) Electoral 
Commission as a possible regulator: 
 
‘The Electoral Commission has been canvassed as a possible alternative regulatory body. 
The Government, however, sees dangers in conferring such a role on the Electoral 
Commission. Adjudicating over complaints about political advertisements would 
inevitably draw the Electoral Commission into the party political arena in a way that 
could compromise its reputation for even-handedness and independence.’186 
 
It did not provide any alternative candidates.187   
 
The ELC revisited the question of if and how to regulate political advertising in 2004.188  It ruled 
out a statutory code, given the freedom of expression concerns, and the scope of any voluntary 
code could not, in its view, reach the truthfulness of campaign messages: ‘it would seem 
inappropriate and impractical to seek to control misleading or untruthful advertising, given the 
often subjective nature of political claims’.189  It also rehearsed many of the practical problems 
with trying to enforce a code – the need for expeditious decisions, the potential for spurious 
                                                          
186 Government response to Neill Committee, above n 182, para 9.9. 
187 ibid, para 9.10. 
188 ELC, Political advertising: Report and recommendations (June 2004) available at 
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complaints, the need for an independent adjudicatory body (rejecting itself as a candidate, 
together with the ASA model), and the lack of any effective sanctions.  Again, the biggest 
obstacle to the adoption of a regulatory framework was the lack of consensus among the political 
parties.190  This apparent political impasse has now persisted for over two decades.   
 
While there currently exists no regulation of political advertising content, the ELC and ASA do 
nevertheless receive a substantial number of complaints on political advertising during political 
campaigns (eg, the ELC received in excess of 1,000 complaints from the public concerning the 
accuracy of campaign literature during the EU referendum).191  This appears to suggest there is a 
public demand for regulation, as is clear from public opinion research.192  Indeed, in evidence 
before the DCMSC, Guy Parker (CEO of the ASA) accepted there is a general public consensus 
that the content of political advertising should be regulated; the ‘difficulty is by who and how’.193  
Regulation would also need ‘buy-in’ which has not been forthcoming from political parties.194   
 
                                                          
190 The Conservative Party stated that it would not abide by a code, while Labour did not respond to the 
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191 I White, N Johnston and E Uberoi Referendum campaign literature Commons Briefing papers CBP-
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Another possible solution is to require social media firms to regulate the content of political 
messages on their platforms.  As the ICR has observed, in the broader context of disinformation, 
this carries potentially ‘dangerous consequences for freedom of expression’ with SMPs, 
especially in the shadow of sanctions, having an incentive ‘to err on the side of caution’ rather 
than carefully balancing harm against freedom of expression.195  Alternatively, the EU 
Commission envisages a greater role for ‘fact-checkers’, with the creation of an independent 
European network.196  Some have gone further, calling for the creation of a ‘truth commission’ to 
intervene to expose misleading campaign claims.197  Others have canvassed the idea of pre-
clearance of factual claims made in political advertisements.198  While fact-checking may have 
an important role to play, practical problems abound, not least how to reach the voters who were 
originally targeted?   
 
The simple hard fact is there is unlikely to be the political desire or will to put in place a robust 
regulatory regime for political advertising content while, as microtargeting increases in scale and 
ubiquity, the need and demand for it continues to grow.  Regulation is probably always going to 
be an ineffective substitute for the glare of public and media scrutiny which microtargeting tends 
to obscure.   
 
                                                          
195 ICR, above n 87, para 14.26.   
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(e) The regulatory perspective: ‘speaking softly carrying big sticks’?199 
 
It has already been noted that social media companies have implemented a number of reforms to 
guard against the distortion of the political debate in the UK and beyond.  In particular, progress 
has been made include the display of ‘disclaimers’ and the provision of online repositories.  
These initiatives have been broadly welcomed, though the ELC has stated that if the industry’s 
‘voluntary’ proposals do not work, the Government should consider direct regulation.200  On 
both these reforms, the Government have committed to including them in a code of practice,201 
as part of its broader initiatives to deal with ‘online harms’.202  The code, which will also include 
fact-checking requirements,203 would be backed up by regulator with significant enforcement 
powers (including the ability to impose substantial fines and, as a last resort, ‘ISP blocking’ 
powers for non-compliant platforms).204 
 
The EU Commission’s efforts in implementing its Code of Practice has also become a focal 
point for reform.  In anticipation of the European Parliament elections of May 2019, the 
Commission stepped-up its monitoring of the Code’s implementation, with requirements on its 
                                                          
199 J Braithwaite ‘On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of a Republication 
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signatories to report monthly on progress.205  The Commission has been highly critical of the 
major platforms, for example, in failing to provide ‘hard data’.206  Nevertheless, the industry 
have made significant moves to increase transparency.207  Reporting after the conclusion of the 
elections, the Commission was able to announce progress, while leaving open the option to 
legislate in the future.208   
 
While not the focus of this paper, data protection and privacy laws may be another regulatory 
vehicle to deal with microtargeting.209  Under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)210 
the processing of data pertaining to ‘political opinions’ (a category of ‘sensitive data’) is 
prohibited subject to strictly limited exceptions.211  It also contains a public interest exception, 
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permitting the processing of data on political opinions ‘in the course of electoral activities’.212  
According to the ICO, where political campaigners make use of data analytics, aggregating data 
from SMPs and other sources, it must inform the data subjects, although a public statement on 
the organisation’s website may suffice.213  The EU Commission’s guidance notes ‘when lifestyle 
data brokers or platforms collect data for commercial purposes, that data cannot be further 
processed in the electoral context’.214  Similarly, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) 
recently reiterated the requirement of explicit consent for automated profiling.215   
 
There are also restrictions on campaigning by political organisations under the ePrivacy 
Directive.216  As a form of direct marketing, ‘unsolicited’ political communications may require 
consent.217  Since 2009, that Directive also requires prior consent to the storage of cookies and 
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other tracking technologies on end users’ devices.218  There is currently a draft ePrivacy 
Regulation219 which, if adopted, would significantly restrict the use of ‘metadata’, a matter of 
particular controversy.220   
 
Both the GDPR and ePrivacy rules offer the potential to substantially restrict microtargeting, 
although much depends upon whether data protection authorities have the resources and 
incentives to enter an inherently political arena.221  Nevertheless, recent experience in the UK has 
shown an increasing willingness of the ICO to intervene, both in individual cases222 and the 
broader policy debate, with the Information Commissioner arguing for an ‘ethical pause’ on 
microtargeting.223  The critical question here is the extent to which it is desirable to use data 
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protection and privacy laws as a means of regulating microtargeting.  There is the possible 
danger that freedom of political expression will not be given appropriate weight when it comes 
to the careful balancing of rights necessary in designing appropriate restrictions on digital 
campaigning.   
 
It appears then that there is an emerging consensus on the need to regulate online advertising, 
and the industry has made efforts to ensure political campaigning on their platforms are more 
closely aligned to the underlying norms of electoral law, especially as regards transparency.  
Indeed, in this regard, it is significant that Mark Zuckerberg (the CEO of Facebook) has called 
for legislation to regulate digital campaigning.224  The emerging solution is a system of co-
regulation, whereby government and regulatory agencies frame principles and guidelines at a 
formal level, with implementation resting with the industry.  The likelihood of such measures 
achieving success depends upon the credibility of threats to intervene with sanctions, and even 
direct regulation, should industry-led initiatives fail.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As one of the leading critics of microtargeting observes, ‘we have anxieties about micro-
targeting because we have anxieties about democracy itself’.225  So we should caution judging 
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this practice against an idealised version of democracy, where voters are rational and seek to be 
informed, shaping their preferences in the general interest.  Furthermore, we know that despite 
the apparent appetite of political parties to use political advertising generally, there is evidence 
that it has limited persuasive effects.226  That said, the so-called ‘minimal effects thesis’ tends to 
underplay the ability of political advertising to increase the saliency of particular types of issues, 
especially those of an emotional nature, likely to invoke feelings of fear and anxiety.227   
 
While the evidence of the effects of digital campaigning generally may be ambiguous, there are 
specific techniques and consequences associated with microtargeting which give rise to 
particular unease.  Principal among these is the danger that targeting allows politicians to 
communicate with voters in an unmediated way, thereby escaping the glare of public scrutiny, 
and undermining the integrity of the public sphere.  Increasing the transparency of online 
advertising, while necessary, is only a partial solution to this problem.  A digital imprint 
requirement will contribute to transparency, but enforcement brings with it a new set of 
problems, not least the potential ‘chilling effect’ of online political discourse.  And as 
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microtargeting becomes more efficient, online repositories are likely to be ‘overwhelmed’ by the 
ever increasing volumes of messages generated.228   
 
A different way of framing the question is to ask what ‘value’ does microtargeting have, 
ensuring we continue to benefit from innovations in digital campaigning.  It would certainly be 
useful if there was further evidence of the effects of microtargeting, both positive and 
negative.229  Any case for reform is clearly easier to advance if regulation itself is targeted; 
seeking to mitigate some of the less palatable consequences of the practice, while not stultifying 
some of the potential benefits.  To this end, attempts to regulate the content of political campaign 
messages, either by the intermediaries or through direct regulation, are likely to be fraught with 
dangers, restricting political speech in a way which is inimical to democracy.  The best solution 
is to increase the transparency of political campaigning through imprint requirements and the use 
of digital repositories.  Nevertheless, restrictions on the means of communication can and should 
be considered in the future if less restrictive measure prove to be unsuccessful.  The risk to 
democratic discourse is sufficient to justify restrictions on microtargeting, as a last resort.   
 
As we have seen previously, it is very difficult to build a consensus among politicians and their 
parties over regulating political advertising.  Politicians are alert to digital campaigning as a 
means of securing a comparative advantage over their adversaries.  Perhaps the ‘arms race’ 
narrative, so successfully employed in the UK to justify the ban on broadcast advertising, is now 
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being realised in the online environment.  Is it likely that politicians will be able to remove from 
themselves the use of such a powerful and efficient campaigning tool?  Even if the political class 
are persuaded of the need for regulation, are the regulators likely to enthusiastically assume the 
mantle?  Mindful of the need to protect the perception of their independence, would any rational 
regulator want to adjudicate on a political party’s marketing behaviour in the heat of an electoral 
campaign?  What might be the possible implications for that regulator, and its personnel, after 
the polls have closed?   
 
Freedom of political expression is a core value in any democratic state, and any restrictions upon 
it need to be justified carefully and fully.  Nevertheless, online political advertising is changing 
the nature of our campaigns, our politics and, ultimately, our democracy; for this reason it must 
not escape the most intense scrutiny, now and in the future.   
